Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 7 (2003)

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286

MEYER v. HOLLEY

Opinion of the Court

("The principal is liable for the acts and negligence of the agent in the course of his employment, although he did not authorize or did not know of the acts complained of"); see Rosenthal & Co. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 802 F. 2d 963, 967 (CA7 1986) (" 'respondeat superior' . . . is a doctrine about employers . . . and other principals"); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(1) (1957) (Restatement). And in the absence of special circumstances it is the corporation, not its owner or officer, who is the principal or employer, and thus subject to vicarious liability for torts committed by its employees or agents. 3A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations § 1137, pp. 300-301 (rev. ed. 1991-1994); 10 id., § 4877 (rev. ed. 1997- 2001). The Restatement § 1 specifies that the relevant principal/agency relationship demands not only control (or the right to direct or control) but also "the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf . . . , and consent by the other so to act." (Emphasis added.) A corporate employee typically acts on behalf of the corporation, not its owner or officer.

The Ninth Circuit held that the Fair Housing Act imposed more extensive vicarious liability—that the Act went well beyond traditional principles. The Court of Appeals held that the Act made corporate owners and officers liable for the unlawful acts of a corporate employee simply on the basis that the owner or officer controlled (or had the right to control) the actions of that employee. We do not agree with the Ninth Circuit that the Act extended traditional vicarious liability rules in this way.

For one thing, Congress said nothing in the statute or in the legislative history about extending vicarious liability in this manner. And Congress' silence, while permitting an inference that Congress intended to apply ordinary background tort principles, cannot show that it intended to apply an unusual modification of those rules.

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