FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 2 (2003)

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

294

FCC v. NEXTWAVE PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.

Syllabus

is a "governmental unit" that has "revoke[d]" a "license," and that Next-Wave is a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Act. Pp. 301-308.

(a) The Court rejects petitioners' argument that the FCC did not revoke NextWave's licenses "solely because" of nonpayment under § 525(a). The fact that the FCC had a valid regulatory motive for its action is irrelevant. Section 525 means nothing more or less than that the failure to pay a dischargeable debt must alone be the proximate cause of the cancellation, whatever the agency's ultimate motive may be. Pp. 301-302.

(b) The FCC's contention that regulatory conditions like full and timely payment are not properly classified as "debts" under § 525(a) fails. Under the Bankruptcy Code, "debt" means "liability on a claim," § 101(12), and "claim," in turn, includes any "right to payment," § 101(5)(A). The plain meaning of a "right to payment" is nothing more nor less than an enforceable obligation, regardless of the Government's objectives in imposing the obligation. E. g., Pennsylvania Dept. of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U. S. 552, 559. Also rejected is petitioners' argument that NextWave's obligations are not "dischargeable" under § 525(a) because it is beyond the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional authority to alter or modify regulatory obligations. Dischargeability is not tied to the existence of such authority. The Bankruptcy Code states that confirmation of a reorganization plan discharges the debtor from any debt that arose before the confirmation date, 11 U. S. C. § 1141(d)(1)(A), and the only debts it excepts from that prescription are those described in § 523, see § 1141(d)(2). Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U. S. 274, 278. Petitioners' contention that the D. C. Circuit has no power to modify or discharge a debt is irrelevant to whether that court can set aside agency action that violates § 525, which is all that it did when it prevented the FCC from canceling licenses because of failure to pay debts dischargeable by bankruptcy courts. Pp. 302-304.

(c) Finally, this Court's interpretation of § 525 does not, as petitioners contend, create a conflict with the Communications Act by obstructing the functioning of that Act's auction provisions. Nothing in those provisions demands that cancellation be the sanction for failure to make agreed-upon periodic payments or even requires the FCC to permit payment to be made over time. What petitioners describe as a conflict boils down to nothing more than a policy preference on the FCC's part for (1) selling licenses on credit and (2) canceling licenses rather than asserting security interests when there is a default. Such administrative preferences cannot be the basis for denying NextWave rights provided by a law's plain terms. P. 304.

254 F. 3d 130, affirmed.

Page:   Index   Previous  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007