304
Opinion of the Court
violating § 525 by canceling licenses because of failure to pay debts dischargeable by bankruptcy courts.
C
Finally, our interpretation of § 525 does not create any conflict with the Communications Act. It does not, as petitioners contend, obstruct the functioning of the auction provisions of 47 U. S. C. § 309( j), since nothing in those provisions demands that cancellation be the sanction for failure to make agreed-upon periodic payments. Indeed, nothing in those provisions even requires the Commission to permit payment to be made over time, rather than leaving it to impecunious bidders to finance the full purchase price with private lenders. What petitioners describe as a conflict boils down to nothing more than a policy preference on the FCC's part for (1) selling licenses on credit and (2) canceling licenses rather than asserting security interests in licenses when there is a default. Such administrative preferences cannot be the basis for denying respondent rights provided by the plain terms of a law. " '[W]hen two statutes are capable of coexistence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective.' " J. E. M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc., 534 U. S. 124, 143-144 (2001) (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 551 (1974)). There being no inherent conflict between § 525 and the Communications Act, "we can plainly regard each statute as effective." J. E. M., supra, at 144. And since § 525 circumscribes the Commission's permissible action, the revocation of Next-Wave's licenses is not in accordance with law. See 5 U. S. C. § 706.
III*
The dissent finds it "dangerous . . . to rely exclusively upon the literal meaning of a statute's words," post, at 311 (opinion
*Justice Stevens does not join this Part.
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