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Opinion of Stevens, J.
censes through the regulatory step of "revoking" them— action that the statute specifically forbids.) In any event, if there is an anomaly it is one that has been created by Congress—a state of affairs the dissent does not think intolerable, since its own disposition creates the anomaly of allowing the government to reclaim its property by means other than the enforcement of a security interest, but not permitting private individuals to do so.
* * *
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is
Affirmed.
Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
Because these are such close cases, it seems appropriate to identify the considerations that have persuaded me to join the majority. When I first read 11 U. S. C. § 525(a), I thought it was not intended to apply to cases in which the licensor was also a creditor, but rather, as Justice Breyer persuasively argues, was merely intended to protect the debtor from discriminatory license terminations. I remain persuaded that that is the principal purpose of the provision. It is significant, however, that the first words in the section describe three exceptions for statutes, one of which contains language remarkably similar to the language in the security
B. R. 314 (Bkrtcy. Ct. SDNY 1999). However, after NextWave prepared a plan of reorganization the FCC asserted that the licenses had been automatically canceled and gave notice of its intent to reauction them. The Second Circuit treated this decision as "regulatory," and thus outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Court's jurisdiction. See In re Federal Communications Commission, 217 F. 3d 125, 139, 136 (2000). The decision by the D. C. Circuit recognized and seemingly approved that distinction. See 254 F. 3d 130, 143 (2001).
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