FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 25 (2003)

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Cite as: 537 U. S. 293 (2003)

Breyer, J., dissenting

matically, but also that the defendant know that the gun meets the statute's description).

This interpretation is consistent with several lower court efforts to interpret the statute. See, e. g., Toth v. Michigan State Housing Development Authority, 136 F. 3d 477, 480 (CA6), cert. denied, 524 U. S. 954 (1998); In re Exquisito Services, Inc., 823 F. 2d 151, 153 (CA5 1987); In re Smith, 259 B. R. 901, 906 (Bkrtcy. App. Panel CA8 2001). But see In re Stoltz, 315 F. 3d 80 (CA2 2002). It would avoid handicapping government debt collection efforts in ways that Congress did not intend. It would further the statute's basic purpose—preventing discrimination and preserving bank-ruptcy's "fresh start." And it would avoid interfering with legitimate public debt collection efforts. An individual could not generally promise to pay for a public asset, go into bankruptcy, avoid the payment obligation, and keep the asset—even in the absence of the evils at which this statute is aimed.

This statutory approach is far from novel. Well over a century ago, the Court interpreted a statute that forbade knowing and willful obstruction of the mail as containing an implicit exception permitting a local sheriff to arrest a mail carrier. United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall., at 485-487. Justice Field, writing for the Court, pointed out that centuries earlier the British courts had interpreted a statute making it a felony to break out of prison not to extend to a breakout when the prison is on fire. Id., at 487. And, similarly, the courts of Bologna had interpreted a statute punishing severely " 'whoever drew blood in the streets' " not to extend to a surgeon faced with an emergency. Ibid. "[C]ommon sense," wrote Justice Field, "accepts" these rulings. Ibid. So too does common sense suggest that we should interpret the present statute not to extend to revocation efforts that are no more closely related to the statute's objectives than are baby strollers to the "vehicles" forbidden entry into the park. See supra, at 311.

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