Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 11 (2003)

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Cite as: 537 U. S. 371 (2003)

Opinion of the Court

the law governing rulemaking and interpretation by an administrative agency. Nor did the state court think it significant that it was the Commissioner of Social Security who had appointed the department to serve as representative payee for respondents' Social Security benefits. See id., at 25, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (calling the department's representative payee status "at best immaterial to the analysis"). To the contrary, the court ultimately reasoned that the depart-ment's capacity as representative payee "further undercuts the legality of its reimbursement process" because a representative payee is charged with acting " 'in the best interests of the beneficiary.'" Id., at 24, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (emphasis in original) (quoting 20 CFR § 404.2035(a)). "We seriously doubt using [Social Security] benefits to reimburse the state for its public assistance expenditure is in all cases, or even some, 'in the best interests of the beneficiary.' " 145 Wash. 2d, at 24, 32 P. 3d, at 278 (quoting § 404.2035(a)).5

Three justices concurred in part and dissented in part. They agreed with the majority that the department's use of Social Security benefits for "past due foster care payments" violated the antiattachment provisions of the Act. Id., at 27, 32 P. 3d, at 279 (opinion of Bridge, J.) (emphasis in original). But they would have held that the department is entitled to use benefits to pay for "current maintenance costs, provided that any special needs of the children are satisfied first." Ibid. (emphasis in original).

After staying the State Supreme Court's mandate, 535 U. S. 923 (2002), we granted certiorari, 535 U. S. 1094 (2002), and now reverse.

5 The State Supreme Court ultimately remanded for further consideration of the scope and basis for awarding attorney's fees. Our jurisdiction, which is premised on a "[f]inal judgmen[t] or decre[e]" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257(a), is unaffected by this disposition. See Pierce County v. Guillen, ante, at 142-143.

381

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