490
Syllabus
the Government would hold land thus allotted in trust for the sole use and benefit of the allottee, § 348—did not authorize an award of money damages against the United States for alleged mismanagement of forests located on allotted lands. The Court concluded that the GAA created only a limited trust relationship that did not impose any duty upon the Government to manage timber resources. Mitchell I, 445 U. S., at 542. In Mitchell II, however, the Court held that a network of other statutes and regulations did impose judicially enforceable fiduciary duties upon the United States in its management of forested allotted lands, 463 U. S., at 222-224, and that the relevant prescriptions could fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government when it breached those duties, id., at 226-227. To state a claim cognizable under the Indian Tucker Act, Mitchell I and Mitchell II instruct, a tribe must identify a substantive source of law that establishes specific fiduciary or other duties, and allege that the Government has failed faithfully to perform those duties. See Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 216- 217, 219. If that threshold is passed, the court must then determine whether the relevant source of substantive law "can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for damages sustained as a result of a breach of the duties [the governing law] impose[s]." Id., at 219. Although "the undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people" can "reinforc[e]" the conclusion that the relevant statute or regulation imposes fiduciary duties, id., at 225, that relationship alone is insufficient to support jurisdiction under the Indian Tucker Act. Instead, the analysis must train on specific rights-creating or duty-imposing statutory or regulatory prescriptions. Those prescriptions, however, need not expressly provide for money damages; the availability of such damages may be inferred. See id., at 217, n. 16. Pp. 503-506.
(c) The statutes and regulations at issue cannot fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation for the Government's alleged breach of trust in this case. Pp. 506-514.
(1) The IMLA and its regulations do not provide the requisite "substantive law" that "mandat[es] compensation by the Federal Government." Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 218. They impose no obligations resembling the detailed fiduciary responsibilities that Mitchell II found adequate to support a claim for money damages. The IMLA simply requires Secretarial approval before coal mining leases negotiated between Tribes and third parties become effective, § 396a, and authorizes the Secretary generally to promulgate regulations governing mining operations, § 396d. Unlike the "elaborate" provisions before the Court in Mitchell II, 463 U. S., at 225, the IMLA and its regulations do not "give the Federal Government full responsibility to manage Indian
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