214
Souter, J., dissenting
itself. But this is not such a case. Garceau first entered the federal court to seek appointment of habeas counsel under 21 U. S. C. § 848(q)(4)(B), and his subsequently appointed lawyer then petitioned under 28 U. S. C. § 2251 for a stay of execution while preparing a habeas petition. I therefore think this case calls for the principle that related statutory provisions are to be read together, see, e. g., Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U. S. 561, 573 (1989) (citing Brown v. Duchesne, 19 How. 183, 194 (1857)). AEDPA's amendment of § 2254 ought to be understood in light of § 2251.
When counsel, appointed to prepare and litigate a habeas petition under § 2254, seeks a stay of execution under § 2251, the district court will at some point condition the continuation of any stay on its assessment of the substantiality of the issues counsel expects to raise in the petition yet to be filed, a judgment that will call for some consideration of standards for federal relief in cases governed by § 2254. When a district court's exercise of jurisdiction for habeas purposes occurs during the transition from an earlier to a later version of § 2254, it makes sense to hold that the version to be applied in a given case is the one in effect when the habeas court first takes account of § 2254 standards for habeas relief. A case should thus be considered filed for purposes of the Lindh rule by the time the habeas court makes a determination that takes standards for federal relief into consideration.
When the District Court took its initial look at anticipated claims in this case, for example, it was clear that the habeas petition might well be filed before the effective date of the amendment to § 2254; it was thus appropriate for the District Court to consider the possible merit of the claim in light of the earlier, existing law. As a consequence, it would be reasonable to apply that law throughout. There would not be much point, after all, in relying on existing law to judge the merits of a stay, if counsel could not rely on existing law in preparing the case. Otherwise the court could be staying
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