Cite as: 538 U. S. 11 (2003)
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
(1958); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U. S. 808, 824 (1991); Rummel, 445 U. S., at 274; Solem, 463 U. S., at 290; Harmelin, 501 U. S., at 998 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution "does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory." Id., at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). A sentence can have a variety of justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation. See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 1.5, pp. 30-36 (1986) (explaining theories of punishment). Some or all of these justifications may play a role in a State's sentencing scheme. Selecting the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not federal courts.
When the California Legislature enacted the three strikes law, it made a judgment that protecting the public safety requires incapacitating criminals who have already been convicted of at least one serious or violent crime. Nothing in the Eighth Amendment prohibits California from making that choice. To the contrary, our cases establish that "States have a valid interest in deterring and segregating habitual criminals." Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20, 27 (1992); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U. S. 448, 451 (1962) ("[T]he constitutionality of the practice of inflicting severer criminal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to serious challenge"). Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment. See AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 230 (1998) (recidivism "is as typical a sentencing factor as one might imagine"); Witte v. United States, 515 U. S. 389, 400 (1995) ("In repeatedly upholding such recidivism statutes, we have rejected double jeopardy challenges because the enhanced punishment imposed for the later offense . . . [is] 'a stiffened penalty for the latest crime, which is considered to be an aggravated
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