Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 22 (2003)

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

32

EWING v. CALIFORNIA

Stevens, J., dissenting

plurality must then add an analysis to show that "Ewing's sentence is justified by the State's public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist felons." Ante, at 29.

Which indeed it is—though why that has anything to do with the principle of proportionality is a mystery. Perhaps the plurality should revise its terminology, so that what it reads into the Eighth Amendment is not the unstated proposition that all punishment should be reasonably proportionate to the gravity of the offense, but rather the unstated proposition that all punishment should reasonably pursue the multiple purposes of the criminal law. That formulation would make it clearer than ever, of course, that the plurality is not applying law but evaluating policy.

Because I agree that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, I concur in the judgment.

Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment. I agree with Justice Scalia's view that the proportionality test announced in Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277 (1983), is incapable of judicial application. Even were Solem's test perfectly clear, however, I would not feel compelled by stare decisis to apply it. In my view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 966-985 (1991) (opinion of Scalia, J.). Because the plurality concludes that petitioner's sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, I concur in the judgment.

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer join, dissenting.

Justice Breyer has cogently explained why the sentence imposed in this case is both cruel and unusual.1 The concur-1 For "present purposes," post, at 36, 53 (dissenting opinion), Justice Breyer applies the framework established by Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U. S. 957, 1004-1005 (1991), in analyzing Ewing's Eighth Amendment

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007