Cite as: 538 U. S. 11 (2003)
Stevens, J., dissenting
rences prompt this separate writing to emphasize that proportionality review is not only capable of judicial application but also required by the Eighth Amendment.
"The Eighth Amendment succinctly prohibits 'excessive' sanctions." Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304, 311 (2002); see also U. S. Const., Amdt. 8 ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted"). Faithful to the Amendment's text, this Court has held that the Constitution directs judges to apply their best judgment in determining the proportionality of fines, see, e. g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 334-336 (1998), bail, see, e. g., Stack v. Boyle, 342 U. S. 1, 5 (1951), and other forms of punishment, including the imposition of a death sentence, see, e. g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584, 592 (1977). It "would be anomalous indeed" to suggest that the Eighth Amendment makes proportionality review applicable in the context of bail and fines but not in the context of other forms of punishment, such as imprisonment. Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 289 (1983). Rather, by broadly prohibiting excessive sanctions, the Eighth Amendment directs judges to exercise their wise judgment in assessing the proportionality of all forms of punishment.
The absence of a black-letter rule does not disable judges from exercising their discretion in construing the outer limits on sentencing authority that the Eighth Amendment imposes. After all, judges are "constantly called upon to draw . . . lines in a variety of contexts," id., at 294, and to exercise their judgment to give meaning to the Constitution's broadly phrased protections. For example, the Due Process Clause directs judges to employ proportionality reclaim. I agree with Justice Breyer that Ewing's sentence is grossly disproportionate even under Harmelin's narrow proportionality framework. However, it is not clear that this case is controlled by Harmelin, which considered the proportionality of a life sentence imposed on a drug offender who had no prior felony convictions. Rather, the three-factor analysis established in Solem v. Helm, 463 U. S. 277, 290-291 (1983), which specifically addressed recidivist sentencing, seems more directly on point.
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