Cite as: 538 U. S. 456 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
II
A
Respondent and its amici first contend that § 1367(d) is facially invalid because it exceeds the enumerated powers of Congress. We disagree. Although the Constitution does not expressly empower Congress to toll limitations periods for state-law claims brought in state court, it does give Congress the authority "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution [Congress's Article I, § 8,] Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States . . . ." Art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The enactment of § 1367(d) was not the first time Congress prescribed the alteration of a state-law limitations period; 1 nor is this the first case in which we have ruled on its authority to do so. In Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall.
1 See, e. g., Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, 50 U. S. C. App. § 525 ("The period of military service shall not be included in computing any period now or hereafter to be limited by any law, regulation, or order for the bringing of any action or proceeding in any court . . . by or against any person in military service"); 42 U. S. C. § 9658(a)(1) ("In the case of any action brought under State law for personal injury, or property damages, which are caused or contributed to by exposure to any hazardous substance, or pollutant or contaminant, released into the environment from a facility, if the applicable limitations period for such action (as specified in the State statute of limitations or under common law) provides a commencement date which is earlier than the federally required commencement date, such period shall commence at the federally required commencement date in lieu of the date specified in such State statute"); 11 U. S. C. § 108(c) ("Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy law . . . fixes a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor . . . and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such period does not expire until the later of—(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect to such claim").
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