Cite as: 538 U. S. 11 (2003)
Appendix to opinion of Breyer, J.
other factors that I have discussed, along with the questions that I have asked along the way, should help to identify "gross disproportionality" in a fairly objective way—at the outer bounds of sentencing.
In sum, even if I accept for present purposes the plurality's analytical framework, Ewing's sentence (life imprisonment with a minimum term of 25 years) is grossly disproportionate to the triggering offense conduct—stealing three golf clubs—Ewing's recidivism notwithstanding.
For these reasons, I dissent.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF BREYER, J.
A
Thirty-three jurisdictions, as well as the federal courts, have laws that would make it impossible to sentence a Ewing-type offender to more than 10 years in prison: 1
Federal: 12 to 18 months. USSG § 2B1.1 (Nov. 1999); id., ch. 5, pt. A, Sentencing Table.
Alaska: three to five years; presumptive term of three years. Alaska Stat. §§ 11.46.130(a)(1), (c), 12.55.125(e) (2000).
Arizona: four to six years; presumptive sentence of five years. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-604(C), 13-1802(E) (West 2001).
Connecticut: 1 to 10 years. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 53a- 35a(6), 53a-40( j), 53a-124(a)(2) (2001).
Delaware: not more than two years. Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 840(d) (Supp. 2000); § 4205(b)(7) (1995). Recidivist offender penalty not applicable. See § 4214; Buckingham v. State, 482 A. 2d 327 (Del. 1984).
District of Columbia: not more than 10 years. D. C. Code Ann. § 22-3212(a) (West 2001). Recidivist offender penalty
1 Throughout Appendix, Parts A-D, the penalties listed for each jurisdiction are those pertaining to imprisonment and do not reflect any possible fines or other forms of penalties applicable under the laws of the jurisdiction.
53
Page: Index Previous 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007