Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 18 (2003)

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80

LOCKYER v. ANDRADE

Souter, J., dissenting

theft.1 To understand why it is revealing to look at the sentence this way, it helps to recall the basic difficulty inherent in proportionality review. We require the comparison of offense and penalty to disclose a truly gross disproportionality before the constitutional limit is passed, in large part because we believe that legislatures are institutionally equipped with better judgment than courts in deciding what penalty is merited by particular behavior. Solem, supra, at 290. In this case, however, a court is substantially aided in its reviewing function by two determinations made by the State itself.

The first is the State's adoption of a particular penalogical theory as its principal reason for shutting a three-strikes defendant away for at least 25 years. Although the State alludes in passing to retribution or deterrence (see Brief for Petitioner 16, 24; Reply Brief for Petitioner 10), its only serious justification for the 25-year minimum treats the sentence as a way to incapacitate a given defendant from further crime; the underlying theory is the need to protect the public from a danger demonstrated by the prior record of violent and serious crime. See Brief for Petitioner 17 ("significant danger to society such that [defendant] must be imprisoned for no less than twenty-five years to life"); id., at 21 ("statute carefully tailored to address . . . defendants that pose the greatest danger"); id., at 23 ("isolating such a defendant for a substantial period of time"); Reply Brief for Petitioner 11 ("If Andrade's reasoning were accepted, however, California would be precluded from incapacitating him"). See also Rummel, 445 U. S., at 284 ("purpose of a recidivist

1 This point is independent of the fact, recognized by the Court, ante, at 68, that it remains open to Andrade to appeal his sentence under People v. Garcia, 20 Cal. 4th 490, 976 P. 2d 831 (1999) (holding trial court may dismiss strikes on a count-by-count basis; such discretion is consistent with mandatory consecutive sentencing provision).

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