Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8 (2003)

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8

BENEFICIAL NAT. BANK v. ANDERSON

Opinion of the Court

that the two statutes should be construed in the same way. 481 U. S., at 65. Second, the legislative history of ERISA unambiguously described an intent to treat such actions "as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947." Id., at 65-66 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

Thus, a state claim may be removed to federal court in only two circumstances—when Congress expressly so provides, such as in the Price-Anderson Act, supra, at 6, or when a federal statute wholly displaces the state-law cause of action through complete pre-emption.3 When the federal statute completely pre-empts the state-law cause of action, a claim which comes within the scope of that cause of action, even if pleaded in terms of state law, is in reality based on federal law. This claim is then removable under 28 U. S. C. 1441(b), which authorizes any claim that "arises under" federal law to be removed to federal court. In the two categories of cases 4 where this Court has found complete preemption—certain causes of action under the LMRA and ERISA—the federal statutes at issue provided the exclusive cause of action for the claim asserted and also set forth procedures and remedies governing that cause of action. See 29 U. S. C. 1132 (setting forth procedures and remedies for civil claims under ERISA); 185 (describing procedures and remedies for suits under the LMRA).

3 Of course, a state claim can also be removed through the use of the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U. S. C. 1367(a), provided that another claim in the complaint is removable.

4 This Court has also held that federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear posessory land claims under state law brought by Indian tribes because of the uniquely federal "nature and source of the possessory rights of Indian tribes." Oneida Indian Nation of N. Y. v. County of Oneida, 414 U. S. 661, 667 (1974). Because that case turned on the special historical relationship between Indian tribes and the Federal Government, it does not assist the present analysis.

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