Cite as: 539 U. S. 1 (2003)
Scalia, J., dissenting
(1874). The same federal interest that protected national banks from the state taxation that Chief Justice Marshall characterized as the "power to destroy," McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 431 (1819), supports the established interpretation of §§ 85 and 86 that gives those provisions the requisite pre-emptive force to provide removal jurisdiction. In actions against national banks for usury, these provisions supersede both the substantive and the remedial provisions of state usury laws and create a federal remedy for over-charges that is exclusive, even when a state complainant, as here, relies entirely on state law. Because §§ 85 and 86 provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short, no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank. Even though the complaint makes no mention of federal law, it unquestionably and unambiguously claims that petitioners violated usury laws. This cause of action against national banks only arises under federal law and could, therefore, be removed under § 1441.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, dissenting.
Today's opinion takes the view that because the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 86, provides the exclusive cause of action for claims of usury against a national bank, all such claims—even if explicitly pleaded under state law—are to be construed as "aris[ing] under" federal law for purposes of our jurisdictional statutes. Ante this page. This view finds scant support in our precedents and no support whatever in the National Bank Act or any other Act of Congress. I respectfully dissent.
Unless Congress expressly provides otherwise, the federal courts may exercise removal jurisdiction over state-court actions "of which the district courts of the United States
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