Cite as: 539 U. S. 146 (2003)
Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment
ess by allowing them to establish and pay the administrative expenses of [PACs]." National Right to Work, supra, at 201; see also Austin, supra, at 660; Massachusetts Citizens for Life, supra, at 252. The PAC option allows corporate political participation without the temptation to use corporate funds for political influence, quite possibly at odds with the sentiments of some shareholders or members, and it lets the Government regulate campaign activity through registration and disclosure, see §§ 432-434, without jeopardizing the associational rights of advocacy organizations' members, see NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 462 (1958) (holding that "[c]ompelled disclosure of membership in an organization engaged in advocacy of particular beliefs" may violate the First Amendment).
NCRL cannot prevail, then, simply by arguing that a ban on an advocacy corporation's direct contributions is bad tailoring. NCRL would have to demonstrate that the law violated the First Amendment in allowing contributions to be made only through its PAC and subject to a PAC's administrative burdens. But a unanimous Court in National Right to Work did not think the regulatory burdens on PACs, including restrictions on their ability to solicit funds, rendered a PAC unconstitutional as an advocacy corporation's sole avenue for making political contributions. See 459 U. S., at 201-202. There is no reason to think the burden on advocacy corporations is any greater today, or to reach a different conclusion here.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment.
My position, expressed in dissenting opinions in previous cases, has been that the Court erred in sustaining certain state and federal restrictions on political speech in the cam-
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