Thomas, J., dissenting
paign finance context and misapprehended basic First Amendment principles in doing so. See Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 409 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652, 699 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 626 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). I adhere to this view, and so can give no weight to those authorities in the instant case.
That said, it must be acknowledged that Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), contains language supporting the Court's holding here that corporate contributions can be regulated more closely than corporate expenditures. The language upon which the Court relies tends to reconcile the tension between the approach in MCFL and the Court's earlier decision in Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U. S. 197 (1982).
Were we presented with a case in which the distinction between contributions and expenditures under the whole scheme of campaign finance regulation were under review, I might join Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion. The Court does not undertake that comprehensive examination here, however. And since there is language in MCFL that supports today's holding, I concur in the judgment.
Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Scalia joins, dissenting.
I continue to believe that campaign finance laws are subject to strict scrutiny. Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 465-466 (2001) (Colorado II) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U. S. 604, 640 (1996) (Colorado I) (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).Page: Index Previous 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Next
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