Cite as: 539 U. S. 510 (2003)
Scalia, J., dissenting
The Court's second reason for rejecting the possibility that Schlaich learned of the alleged sexual abuse from Wiggins is even more incomprehensible. The Court claims that "the phrase 'other people's reports' [would] have been an unusual way for counsel to refer to conversations with his client." Ante, at 532. But Schlaich never used the phrase "other people's reports" in describing how he learned of the alleged sexual abuse in Wiggins' foster homes. Schlaich testified only that he learned of Wiggins' borderline mental retardation as it was reported in " 'other people's reports' ":
" 'Q And you also knew that he was borderline mentally retarded?
" 'A Yes.
" 'Q You knew all— " 'A At least I knew that as it was reported in other people's reports, yes.
" 'Q But you knew it?
" 'A Yes.' " App. 490-491 (emphasis added).
It is clear that when Schlaich said, " 'At least I knew that as it was reported in other people's reports,' " id., at 491 (emphasis added), the " 'that' " to which he referred was the fact that Wiggins was borderline mentally retarded—not the other details of Wiggins' background which Schlaich had previously testified he knew.
The Court's final reason for disbelieving Schlaich's sworn testimony is his failure to mention the alleged sexual abuse in the proffer of mitigating evidence he would introduce if the trial court granted his motion to bifurcate. "Counsel's failure to include in the proffer the powerful evidence of repeated sexual abuse is . . . explicable only if we assume that counsel had no knowledge of the abuse." Ante, at 533. But because the only evidence of sexual abuse consisted of Wiggins' own assertions, see App. 464; App. to Pet. for Cert. 177a, 193a (evidence not exactly worthy of the Court's flattering description as "powerful"), there was nothing to prof-
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