Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 42 (2003)

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Cite as: 539 U. S. 510 (2003)

Scalia, J., dissenting

lieve Schlaich's testimony, and because § 2254(e)(1) requires us to respect the state court's factual determination that Wiggins' trial attorneys were aware of Wiggins' background, the Maryland Court of Appeals' legal conclusion—that trial counsel "did not have as detailed or graphic a history as was prepared by Mr. Selvog, but that is not a Constitutional deficiency," Wiggins, supra, at 610, 724 A. 2d, at 16 (emphasis added)—is unassailable under § 2254(d)(1).

B

The Court holds in the alternative that Wiggins has satisfied § 2254(d)(2), which allows a habeas petitioner to escape § 2254(d)'s bar to relief when the state court's adjudication of his claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." (Emphasis added.) This is so, the Court says, because the Maryland Court of Appeals wrongly claimed that Wiggins' social services records "recorded incidences of . . . sexual abuse." 352 Md., at 608-609, 724 A. 2d, at 15.

That it made that claim is true enough. And I will concede that Wiggins has rebutted the presumption of correctness by the "clear and convincing evidence" that § 2254(e)(1) requires. It is both clear and convincing from reading the DSS records that they contain no evidence of sexual abuse. I will also assume, arguendo, that the state court's error was "unreasonable" in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.

Given all that, the Court's conclusion that a § 2254(d)(2) case has been made out still suffers from the irreparable de-after the Court concludes that the petitioner has avoided § 2254(d)'s bar to relief because of that misapplication of Strickland (or because of the alleged mistaken factual assumption "that counsel learned of . . . sexual abuse . . . from the DSS records," ante, at 529), it still must observe § 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness in deciding the merits of the habeas question. See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U. S. 322, 341, 348 (2003).

551

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