Cite as: 539 U. S. 654 (2003)
Stevens, J., concurring
significant expansion of ASARCO is warranted, my view is that Nike lacks the requisite Article III standing to invoke this Court's jurisdiction.
The third reason why I believe this Court has appropriately decided to dismiss the writ as improvidently granted centers around the importance of the difficult First Amendment questions raised in this case. As Justice Brandeis famously observed, the Court has developed, "for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U. S. 288, 346 (1936) (concurring opinion). The second of those rules is that the Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it. Id., at 346- 347. The novelty and importance of the constitutional questions presented in this case provide good reason for adhering to that rule.
This case presents novel First Amendment questions because the speech at issue represents a blending of commercial speech, noncommercial speech and debate on an issue of public importance.5 See post, at 676-678. On the one hand,
defendant's motion to dismiss a state-court complaint alleging that semi-commercial speech was false and misleading. See post, at 668-670 (dissenting opinion). Regardless of whether the "speech-chilling injury" associated with the defense of such a case may or may not outweigh the benefit of having a public forum in which the defendant may establish the truth of the contested statements, such an unprecedented expansion would surely change the character of our standing doctrine, greatly extending ASARCO's reach.
5 Further complicating the novel First Amendment issues in this case is the fact that in this Court Nike seeks to challenge the constitutionality of the private attorney general provisions of California's Unfair Competition Law and False Advertising Law. It apparently did not raise this specific challenge below. Whether the scope of protection afforded to Nike's speech should differ depending on whether the speech is challenged in a
663Page: Index Previous 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 Next
Last modified: October 4, 2007