Cite as: 539 U. S. 654 (2003)
Breyer, J., dissenting
In ASARCO, state taxpayers (who ordinarily lack federal "standing") sued a state agency in state court, seeking a judgment declaring that the State's mineral leasing procedures violated federal law. See 490 U. S., at 610. ASARCO and other mineral leaseholders intervened as defendants. Ibid. The plaintiff taxpayers obtained a state-court judgment declaring that the State's mineral leasing procedures violated federal law. The defendant mineral leaseholders asked this Court to review the judgment. And this Court held that the leaseholders had standing to seek reversal of that judgment here.
The Court wrote:
"When a state court has issued a judgment in a case where plaintiffs in the original action had no standing to sue under the principles governing the federal courts, we may exercise our jurisdiction on certiorari [1] if the judgment of the state court causes direct, specific, and concrete injury to the parties who petition for our review, where [2] the requisites of a case or controversy are also met." Id., at 623-624 (bracketed numbers added).
No one denies that "requisites of a case or controversy" other than standing are met here. But is there "direct, specific, and concrete injury"?
In ASARCO itself, such "injury" consisted of the threat, arising out of the state court's determination, that the defendants' leases might later be canceled (if, say, a third party challenged those leases in later proceedings and showed they were not "made for 'true value' "). Id., at 611-612, 618. Here that "injury" consists of the threat, arising out of the state court's determination, that defendant Nike's speech on public matters might be "chilled" immediately and legally restrained in the future. See supra, at 668. Where is the meaningful difference?
669
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