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Opinion of the Court
"preclud[e] most associations from effectively amplifying the voice of their adherents," contribution limits both "leave the contributor free to become a member of any political association and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf of candidates," and allow associations "to aggregate large sums of money to promote effective advocacy." Ibid. The "overall effect" of dollar limits on contributions is "merely to require candidates and political committees to raise funds from a greater number of persons." Id., at 21- 22. Thus, a contribution limit involving even " 'significant interference' " with associational rights is nevertheless valid if it satisfies the "lesser demand" of being " 'closely drawn' " to match a " 'sufficiently important interest.' " Beaumont, supra, at 162 (quoting Shrink Missouri, supra, at 387-388).39
Our treatment of contribution restrictions reflects more than the limited burdens they impose on First Amendment freedoms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie contribution limits—interests in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance of corruption." National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 208; see also Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 440-441 (2001) (Colorado II). We have said that these interests directly implicate " 'the integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the successful functioning
39 Justice Kennedy accuses us of engaging in a sleight of hand by conflating "unseemly corporate speech" with the speech of political parties and candidates, and then adverting to the "corporate speech rationale as if it were the linchpin of the case." Post, at 290-291 (opinion concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). This is incorrect. The principles set forth here and relied upon in assessing Title I are the same principles articulated in Buckley and its progeny that regulations of contributions to candidates, parties, and political committees are subject to less rigorous scrutiny than direct restraints on speech—including "un-seemly corporate speech."
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