Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy's interpretation of the First Amendment would render Congress powerless to address more subtle but equally dispiriting forms of corruption. Just as troubling to a functioning democracy as classic quid pro quo corruption is the danger that officeholders will decide issues not on the merits or the desires of their constituencies, but according to the wishes of those who have made large financial contributions valued by the officeholder. Even if it occurs only occasionally, the potential for such undue influence is manifest. And unlike straight cash-for-votes transactions, such corruption is neither easily detected nor practical to criminalize. The best means of prevention is to identify and to remove the temptation. The evidence set forth above, which is but a sampling of the reams of disquieting evidence contained in the record, convincingly demonstrates that soft-money contributions to political parties carry with them just such temptation.
Justice Kennedy likewise takes too narrow a view of the appearance of corruption. He asserts that only those transactions with "inherent corruption potential," which he again limits to contributions directly to candidates, justify the inference "that regulating the conduct will stem the appearance of real corruption." Post, at 297-298.49 In our
view, however, Congress is not required to ignore historical evidence regarding a particular practice or to view conduct in isolation from its context. To be sure, mere political favoritism or opportunity for influence alone is insufficient to justify regulation. Ibid. As the record demonstrates, it is the manner in which parties have sold access to federal
on donations that could be used to fund candidate contributions) would have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation.
49 At another point, describing our "flawed reasoning," Justice Kennedy seems to suggest that Congress' interest in regulating the appearance of corruption extends only to those contributions that actually "create . . . corrupt donor favoritism among . . . officeholders." Post, at 299-300. This latter formulation would render Congress' interest in stemming the appearance of corruption indistinguishable from its interest in preventing actual corruption.
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