McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 59 (2003)

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158

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

recipient is the committee itself or another entity. This principle accords with common sense and appears elsewhere in federal laws. E. g., 18 U. S. C. § 201(b)(2) (prohibition on public officials "demand[ing] [or] seek[ing] . . . anything of value personally or for any other person or entity . . ." (emphasis added)); 5 CFR § 2635.203(f)(2) (2003) (restriction on gifts to federal employees encompasses gifts "[g]iven to any other person, including any charitable organization, on the basis of designation, recommendation, or other specification by the employee").

Plaintiffs argue that BCRA itself demonstrates the over-breadth of § 323(a)'s solicitation ban. They point in particular to § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and officeholders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. Compare 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a) with § 441i(e) (Supp. II). The differences between §§ 323(a) and 323(e), however, are without constitutional significance. We have recognized that "the 'differing structures and purposes' of different entities 'may require different forms of regulation in order to protect the integrity of the electoral process,' " National Right to Work, 459 U. S., at 210, and we respect Congress' decision to proceed in incremental steps in the area of campaign finance regulation, see Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238, 258, n. 11 (1986) (MCFL); Buckley, 424 U. S., at 105. The differences between the two provisions reflect Congress' reasonable judgments about the function played by national committees and the interactions between committees and officeholders, subjects about which Members of Congress have vastly superior knowledge.

4. New FECA § 323(a)'s Application to Minor Parties

The McConnell and political party plaintiffs contend that § 323(a) is substantially overbroad and must be stricken on its face because it impermissibly infringes the speech and

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