Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
Buckley that such donations have been made with the intent—and in at least some cases the effect—of gaining influence over federal officeholders.61 Section 323(b) thus promotes an important governmental interest by confronting the corrupting influence that soft-money donations to political parties already have.
Congress also made a prediction. Having been taught the hard lesson of circumvention by the entire history of campaign finance regulation, Congress knew that soft-money donors would react to § 323(a) by scrambling to find another way to purchase influence. It was "neither novel nor implausible," Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391, for Congress to conclude that political parties would react to § 323(a) by directing soft-money contributors to the state committees, and that federal candidates would be just as indebted to these contributors as they had been to those who had formerly contributed to the national parties. We "must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress," Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U. S. 622, 665 (1994) (plurality opinion), particularly when, as here, those predictions are so firmly rooted in relevant history and common sense. Preventing corrupting activity from shift-to my campaign,' " but " 'you can further help my campaign by assisting the Colorado Republican Party' "); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 454 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (" 'Both political parties have found spending soft money with its accompanying hard money match through their state parties to work smoothly, for the most part, and state officials readily acknowledge they are simply "pass throughs" to the vendors providing the broadcast ads or direct mail' " (quoting Magleby Expert Report 37, App. 1510-1511)).
61 The 1998 Senate Report found that, in exchange for a substantial donation to state Democratic committees and candidates, the DNC arranged meetings for the donor with the President and other federal officials. 1 1998 Senate Report 43-44; 2 id., at 2907-2931; 5 id., at 7519. That same Report also detailed how Native American tribes that operated casinos made sizable soft-money contributions to state Democratic committees in apparent exchange for access and influence. 1 id., at 44-46; 2 id., at 3167- 3194; see also McCain Decl., Exh. I (Weisskopf, The Busy Back-Door Men, Time, Mar. 31, 1997, p. 40).
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