McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 77 (2003)

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176

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of the Court

the source or amount of contributions); id., at 521 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (same).

Experience under the current law demonstrates that Congress' concerns about circumvention are not merely hypothetical. Even without the added incentives created by Title I, national, state, and local parties already solicit unregulated soft-money donations to tax-exempt organizations for the purpose of supporting federal electioneering activity. See, e. g., 3 1998 Senate Report 4013 ("In addition to direct contributions from the RNC to nonprofit groups, the senior leadership of the RNC helped to raise funds for many of the coalition's nonprofit organizations"); 4 id., at 5983 (minority views) ("Tax-exempt 'issue advocacy' groups and other conduits were systematically used to circumvent the federal campaign finance laws"); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 517 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.); id., at 848 (Leon, J.). Parties and candidates have also begun to take advantage of so-called "politician 527s," which are little more than soft-money fronts for the promotion of particular federal officeholders and their interests. See id., at 519 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (" 'Virtually every member of Congress in a formal leadership position has his or her own 527 group. . . . In all, Public Citizen found 63 current members of Congress who have their own 527s' " (quoting Public Citizen Congress Watch, Congressional Leaders' Soft Money Accounts Show Need for Campaign Finance Reform Bills, Feb. 26, 2002, p. 6)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 849-850 (Leon, J.). These 527s have been quite successful at raising substantial sums of soft money from corporate interests, as well as from the national parties themselves. See id., at 519-520 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding that 27 industries had each donated over $100,000 in a single year to the top 25 politician 527 groups and that the DNC was the single largest contributor to politician 527 groups (citing Public Citizen Congress Watch, supra, at 10-11)); 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 850 (Leon, J.) (same). Given BCRA's tighter restrictions on

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