McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 146 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of the Court

ments—even if unchallenged for at least 65 years—cannot prove that those requirements are constitutional. But the existence of those regulations means that we must read beyond the briefs in these cases before holding those requirements unconstitutional. Before evaluating the relevant burdens and justifications, we must at least become acquainted with the FCC's own view of the matter. We must follow the Government's regulation-related references to the relevant regulatory records, related FCC regulatory conclusions, and the FCC's enforcement experience. We must take into account, for example, the likelihood that the reason there is "nothing in the record that indicates licensees have treated purchasers unfairly," post, at 361 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting), is that for many decades similar FCC regulations have made that unfair treatment unlawful. And, if we are to avoid disrupting related agency law, we must evaluate what we find in agency records and related experience before holding this similar statutory provision unconstitutional on its face.

Even a superficial examination of those relevant agency materials reveals strong supporting justifications, and a lack of significant administrative burdens. And any additional burden that the statute, viewed facially, imposes upon interests protected by the First Amendment seems slight compared to the strong enforcement-related interests that it serves. Given the FCC regulations and their history, the statutory requirements must survive a facial attack under any potentially applicable First Amendment standard, including that of heightened scrutiny.

That is why the regulations are relevant. That is why the brevity of the Government's discussion here cannot be determinative. That is why we fear that The Chief Justice's contrary view would lead us into an unfortunate—and at present unjustified—revolution in communications law. And that is why we disagree with his dissent.

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