Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of the Court
egy—though, given the First Amendment interest in free and open discussion of campaign issues, we make this assumption purely for argument's sake. Nonetheless, even on that assumption we do not see how BCRA § 504 can be unconstitutional on its face.
For one thing, the statute requires disclosure of names, addresses, and the fact of a request; it does not require disclosure of substantive campaign content. See 47 U. S. C. § 315(e)(2) (Supp. II). For another, the statutory words "as soon as possible," § 315(e)(3), would seem to permit FCC disclosure-timing rules that would avoid any premature disclosure that the Constitution itself would forbid. Further, the plaintiffs do not point to—and our own research cannot find—any specific indication of such a "strategy-disclosure" problem arising during the past 65 years in respect to the existing FCC "candidate request" requirement, where the strategic problem might be expected to be more acute. Finally, we today reject an analogous facial attack—premised on speculations of "advance disclosure"—on a similar BCRA provision. See ante, at 200-201 ( joint opinion). Thus, the "strategy disclosure" argument does not show that BCRA § 504 is unconstitutional on its face, but the plaintiffs remain free to raise this argument when § 504 is applied.
V
The Chief Justice makes two important arguments in response to those we have set forth. First, he says that we "approac[h] § 504 almost exclusively from the perspective of the broadcast licensees, ignoring the interests of candidates and other purchasers, whose speech and association rights are affected." Post, at 359 (dissenting opinion). The Chief Justice is certainly correct in emphasizing the importance of the speech interests of candidates and other potential speakers, but we have not ignored their First Amendment "perspective."
243
Page: Index Previous 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007