300
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
orado I) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part). (2) All party receipts must be connected to, and must create, corrupt donor favoritism among these officeholders. (3) Therefore, regulation of party receipts equals regulation of quids to the party's officeholders.
The reasoning is flawed because the Government's reliance on reasoning parallel to the Colorado I concurrence only establishes the first step in its chain of logic: that a party is a proxy for its candidates generally. It does not establish the second step: that as a proxy for its candidates generally, all moneys the party receives (not just candidate solicited, soft-money donations, or donations used in coordinated activity) represent quids for all the party's candidates and officeholders. The Government's analysis is inconsistent with what a majority of the Justices, in different opinions, have said.
Justice Thomas' dissent in Federal Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Campaign Comm., 533 U. S. 431, 476- 477 (2001) (Colorado II), taken together with Justice Breyer's opinion announcing the judgment of the Court in Colorado I, rebuts the second step of the Government's argument. Justice Thomas demonstrated that a general party-candidate corruption linkage does not exist. As he pointed out:
"The dearth of evidence [of such corruption] is unsurprising in light of the unique relationship between a political party and its candidates: 'The very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and, if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes.' If coordinated expenditures help achieve this aim, the achievement 'does not . . . constitute "a subversion of the political process." ' " Colorado II, supra, at 476-477 (citations omitted).
Page: Index Previous 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007