McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 208 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

very centerpiece of possible corruption), and allows them to solicit soft money for various uses and organizations.

The law in some respects even weakens the regulation of federal candidates and officeholders. Under former law, officeholders were understood to be limited to receipt of hard money by their campaign committees. See 2 U. S. C. §§ 431, 441a (2000 ed. and Supp. II) (setting out the pre-BCRA FECA regime). BCRA, however, now allows them and their campaign committees to receive soft money that fits the hard-money source-and-amount restrictions, so long as the office-holders direct that money on to other nonfederal candidates. See new FECA § 323(e)(1)(B). The majority's characterization of this weakening of the regime as "tightly constrain[ing]" candidates, ante, at 181, n. 70, is a prime example of its unwillingness to confront Congress' own interest or the persisting fact that the regulations violate First Amendment freedoms. The more lenient treatment accorded to incumbency-driven politicians than to party officials who represent broad national constituencies must render all the more suspect Congress' claim that the Act's sole purpose is to stop corruption.

The majority answers this charge by stating the obvious, that "§ 323(e) applies to both officeholders and candidates." Ante, at 185, n. 72. The controlling point, of course, is the practical burden on challengers. That the prohibition applies to both incumbents and challengers in no way establishes that it burdens them equally in that regard. Name recognition and other advantages held by incumbents ensure that as a general rule incumbents will be advantaged by the legislation the Court today upholds.

The Government identifies no valid anticorruption interest justifying §§ 323(a), (b), (d), and (f). The very nature of the restrictions imposed by these provisions makes one all the more skeptical of the Court's explanation of the interests at stake. These provisions cannot stand under the First Amendment.

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