McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 212 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

Buckley's underlying rationale is this: Less exacting review applies to Government regulations that "significantly interfere" with First Amendment rights of association. But any regulation of speech or associational rights creating "markedly greater interference" than such significant interference receives strict scrutiny. Unworkable and ill advised though it may be, Buckley unavoidably sets forth this test:

"Even a ' "significant interference" with protected rights of political association' may be sustained if the State demonstrates [1] a sufficiently important interest and [2] employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, [419 U. S. 477, 488 (1975)]; NAACP v. Button, [371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963)]; Shelton v. Tucker, [364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960)]." 424 U. S., at 25. "The markedly greater burden on basic freedoms [referring to 'the freedom of speech and association'] caused by [expenditure limits] thus cannot be sustained simply by invoking the interest in maximizing the effectiveness of the less intrusive contribution limitations. Rather, the constitutionality of [the expenditure limits] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political expression." Id., at 44-45.*

The majority, oddly enough, first states this standard with relative accuracy, but then denies it. Compare:

* See also Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S. 146, 161 (2003) ("[T]he basic premise we have followed in setting First Amendment standards for reviewing political financial restrictions [is that] the level of scrutiny is based on the importance of the 'political activity at issue' to effective speech or political association"); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U. S. 567, 582 (2000) ("We can think of no heavier burden on a political party's associational freedom. Proposition 198 is therefore unconstitutional unless it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").

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