McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 216 (2003)

Page:   Index   Previous  209  210  211  212  213  214  215  216  217  218  219  220  221  222  223  Next

Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

well to examine the vast overbreadth of the remainder of Title I, so the import of the majority's holding today is understood. Sections 323(a), (b), (d), and (f), 2 U. S. C. §§ 441i(a), (b), (d), and (f) (Supp. II), are not narrowly tailored, cannot survive strict scrutiny, and cannot even be considered closely drawn, unless that phrase is emptied of all meaning.

First, the sections all possess fatal overbreadth. By regulating conduct that does not pose quid pro quo dangers, they are incursions on important categories of protected speech by voters and party officials.

At the next level of analytical detail, § 323(a) is overly broad as well because it regulates all national parties, whether or not they present candidates in federal elections. It also regulates the national parties' solicitation and direction of funds in odd-numbered years when only state and local elections are at stake.

Likewise, while § 323(b) might prohibit some state party conduct that would otherwise be undertaken in conjunction with a federal candidate, it reaches beyond that to a considerable range of campaign speech by the state parties on non-federal issues. A state or local party might want to say: "The Democratic slate for state assembly opposes President Bush's tax policy . . . . Elect the Republican slate to tell Washington, D. C. we don't want higher taxes." Section 323(b) encompasses this essential speech and prohibits it equally with speech that poses a federal officeholder quid quo pro danger.

Other predictable political circumstances further demonstrate § 323(b)'s overbreadth. It proscribes the use of soft money for all state party voter registration efforts occurring within 120 days of a federal election. So, the vagaries of election timing, not any real interest related to corruption, will control whether state parties can spend nonfederally regulated funds on ballot efforts. This overreaching contradicts important precedents that recognize the need to pro-

315

Page:   Index   Previous  209  210  211  212  213  214  215  216  217  218  219  220  221  222  223  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007