McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 223 (2003)

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322

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Opinion of Kennedy, J.

tion, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 200, then Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon the running of the ad. Burdening the First Amendment further by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally acceptable alternative. To the extent § 201 requires advance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinating interests and imposes greater burdens than the First Amendment permits.

Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incorporates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not the broader substance of this section. The majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree.

The statute commands advance disclosure. The Federal Election Commission has issued a regulation under § 212 that, by its terms, does not implement this particular requirement. See 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified at 11 CFR § 109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of § 212 is an issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the advance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when discussing the parallel provision under § 201, is unconstitutional. Contra, ante, at 212 (declining to address the ripeness question in light of the majority's rejection of the challenge to advance notice in § 201).

B. BCRA § 203

The majority permits a new and serious intrusion on speech when it upholds § 203, the key provision in Title II that prohibits corporations and labor unions from using money from their general treasury to fund electioneering

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