Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)
Opinion of Kennedy, J.
to an unconstitutional result under one application, it may lead to a constitutional result under another. Compare infra this page and 321-322 with infra, at 333-337. It is unhelpful to talk in terms of the definition being unconstitutional or constitutional when the only relevant question is whether, as animated by a substantive prohibition, here § 202, the definition leads to unconstitutional results. The other Title II provisions that employ § 304's electioneering communication definition are analyzed below, within the context of the corporate speech rationale and the disclosure provisions. Section 202, however, must be judged under the anticorruption rationale because it does not distinguish according to corporate or union status, and it does not involve disclosure requirements. Section 202 simply limits the speech of all "persons."
Section 202 does satisfy Buckley's anticorruption rationale in one respect: It treats electioneering communications expenditures made by a person in coordination with a candidate as hard-money contributions to that candidate. For many of the same reasons that § 323(e) is valid, § 202, in this single way, is valid: It regulates conduct that poses a quid pro quo danger—satisfaction of a candidate's request.
Insofar as § 202 regulates coordination with a political party, however, it suffers from the same flaws as § 214(a). Congress has instructed us, as much as possible, to sever any infirm portions of statutory text from the valid parts, see BCRA § 401. Following that instruction, I would uphold § 202's text as to its candidate coordination regulation (the first clause of new FECA § 315(a)(7)(C)(ii), 2 U. S. C. § 441a(a)(7)(C)(ii) (Supp. II), but rule invalid its text that applies the coordination provision to political parties.
This provision includes an "advance contracts" aspect as well. That aspect of the provision, on its own, would be invalid, for many of the reasons discussed below with respect to the advance disclosure requirements embodied in BCRA §§ 201 and 212. See infra, at 321-322.
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