McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 252 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting

restrictions on political contributions implicate important First Amendment values and are constitutional only if they are "closely drawn" to reduce the corruption of federal candidates or the appearance of corruption. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 25-27 (1976) (per curiam). Yet, the Court glosses over the breadth of the restrictions, characterizing Title I of BCRA as "do[ing] little more than regulat[ing] the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and unions to contribute large sums of money to influence federal elections, federal candidates, and federal officeholders." Ante, at 138 ( joint opinion of Stevens and O'Connor, JJ.). Because, in reality, Title I is much broader than the Court allows, regulating a good deal of speech that does not have the potential to corrupt federal candidates and officeholders, I dissent.

The linchpin of Title I, new FECA § 323(a), prohibits national political party committees from "solicit[ing]," "receiv-[ing]," "direct[ing] to another person," and "spend[ing]" any funds not subject to federal regulation, even if those funds are used for non-election-related activities. 2 U. S. C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II). The Court concludes that such a restriction is justified because under FECA, "donors have been free to contribute substantial sums of soft money to the national parties, which the parties can spend for the specific purpose of influencing a particular candidate's federal election." Ante, at 145. Accordingly, "[i]t is not only plausible, but likely, that candidates would feel grateful for such donations and that donors would seek to exploit that gratitude." Ibid. But the Court misses the point. Certainly "infusions of money into [candidates'] campaigns," Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U. S. 480, 497 (1985), can be regulated, but § 323(a) does not regulate only donations given to influence a particular federal election; it regulates all donations to national political committees, no matter the use to which the funds are put.

The Court attempts to sidestep the unprecedented breadth of this regulation by stating that the "close relationship be-

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