McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 264 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Stevens, J., dissenting

that would allow me to conclude that the disclosure of "requests" should be upheld. Such disclosure risks, inter alia, allowing candidates and political groups the opportunity to ferret out a purchaser's political strategy and, ultimately, unduly burdens the First Amendment freedoms of purchasers.

Absent some showing of a Government interest served by § 504 and in light of the breadth of disclosure of "requests," I must conclude that § 504 fails to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.

Justice Stevens, dissenting with respect to § 305.* The Chief Justice, writing for the Court, concludes that the McConnell plaintiffs lack standing to challenge § 305 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) because Senator McConnell cannot be affected by the provision until "45 days before the Republican primary election in 2008." Ante, at 226. I am not persuaded that Article III's case-or-controversy requirement imposes such a strict temporal limit on our jurisdiction. By asserting that he has run attack ads in the past, that he plans to run such ads in his next campaign, and that § 305 will adversely affect his campaign strategy, Senator McConnell has identified a "concrete," " 'distinct,' " and "actual" injury, Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U. S. 149, 155 (1990). That the injury is distant in time does not make it illusory.

The second prong of the standing inquiry—whether the alleged injury is fairly traceable to the defendants' challenged action and not the result of a third party's independent choices†—poses a closer question. Section 305 does not require broadcast stations to charge a candidate higher rates for unsigned ads that mention the candidate's opponent. Rather, the provision simply permits stations to charge their normal rates for such ads. Some stations may take advan-*Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer join this opinion in its entirety.

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 560-561 (1992).

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