McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 270 (2003)

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96

McCONNELL v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N

Syllabus

tees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations. Pp. 143-154. (2) Section 323(a) is not impermissibly overbroad because it subjects all funds raised and spent by national parties to FECA's hard-money source and amount limits, including, e. g., funds spent on purely state and local elections in which no federal office is at stake. The record demonstrates that the close relationship between federal officeholders and the national parties, as well as the means by which parties have traded on that relationship, have made all large soft-money contributions to national parties suspect, regardless of how those funds are ultimately used. The Government's strong interests in preventing corruption, and particularly its appearance, are thus sufficient to justify subjecting all donations to national parties to FECA's source, amount, and disclosure limitations. Pp. 154-156. (3) Nor is § 323(a)'s prohibition on national parties' soliciting or directing soft-money contributions substantially overbroad. That prohibition's reach is limited, in that it bars only soft-money solicitations by national party committees and party officers acting in their official capacities; the committees themselves remain free to solicit hard money on their own behalf or that of state committees and state and local candidates and to contribute hard money to state committees and candidates. Plaintiffs argue unpersuasively that the solicitation ban's overbreadth is demonstrated by § 323(e), which allows federal candidates and office-holders to solicit limited amounts of soft money from individual donors under certain circumstances. The differences between §§ 323(a) and 323(e) are without constitutional significance, see National Right to Work, supra, at 210, reflecting Congress' reasonable and expert judgments about national committees' functions and their interactions with officeholders. Pp. 157-158. (4) Section 323(a) is not substantially overbroad with respect to the speech and associational rights of minor parties, even though the latter may have slim prospects for electoral success. It is reasonable to require that all parties and candidates follow the same rules designed to protect the electoral process' integrity. Buckley, 424 U. S., at 34-35. A nascent or struggling minor party can bring an as-applied challenge if § 323(a) prevents it from amassing the resources necessary to engage in effective advocacy. Id., at 21. Pp. 158-159. (5) Plaintiffs' argument that § 323(a) unconstitutionally interferes with the ability of national committees to associate with state and local committees is unpersuasive because it hinges on an unnaturally broad reading of the statutory terms "spend," "receive," "direct," and "solicit." Nothing on § 323(a)'s face prohibits national party officers from sitting down with state and local party committees or candidates to plan

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