McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 273 (2003)

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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003)

Syllabus

venting circumvention of § 323(b)'s other restrictions justifies the requirement of the fourth category of "Federal election activity" that federal funds be used to pay any state or local party employee who spends more than 25% of his or her compensated time on activities connected with a federal election. Pp. 166-171. (ii) The Levin Amendment does not unjustifiably burden association among party committees by forbidding transfers of Levin funds among state parties, transfers of hard money to fund the allocable federal portion of Levin expenditures, and joint fundraising of Levin funds by state parties. While preserving parties' associational freedom is important, not every minor restriction on parties' otherwise unrestrained ability to associate is of constitutional dimension. See Colorado II, 533 U. S., at 450, n. 11. Given the delicate and interconnected regulatory scheme at issue here, any associational burdens imposed by the Levin Amendment restrictions are far outweighed by the need to prevent circumvention of the entire scheme. Pp. 171-173. (iii) The evidence supporting the argument that the Levin Amendment prevents parties from amassing the resources needed to engage in effective advocacy is speculative. The history of campaign finance regulation proves that political parties are extraordinarily flexible in adapting to new restrictions on their fundraising abilities. Moreover, the mere fact that § 323(b) may reduce the money available to state and local parties to fund federal election activities is largely inconsequential. The question is not whether the amount available over previous election cycles is reduced, but whether the reduction is so radical as to drive the sound of the recipient's voice below the level of notice. Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 397. If state or local parties can make such a showing, as-applied challenges remain available. P. 173. (d) New FECA § 323(d)—which forbids national, state, and local party committees and their agents to "solicit any funds for, or make or direct any donations" to § 501(c) tax-exempt organizations that make expenditures in connection with a federal election, and to § 527 political organizations "other than a political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office," 2 U. S. C. § 441i(d)—is not facially invalid. Pp. 174-181. (1) Section 323(d)'s restriction on solicitations is a valid anti-circumvention measure. Absent this provision, national, state, and local party committees would have significant incentives to mobilize their formidable fundraising apparatuses, including the peddling of access to federal officeholders, into the service of like-minded tax-exempt organizations that conduct activities benefiting their candidates. All of the corruption and the appearance of corruption attendant on the opera-

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