Cite as: 540 U. S. 398 (2004)
Opinion of the Court
the provision of OSS. In re Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York, 15 FCC Rcd. 3953, 3989-4077,
¶¶ 82-228 (1999) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (hereinafter In re Application). Those commitments are enforceable by the FCC through continuing oversight; a failure to meet an authorization condition can result in an order that the deficiency be corrected, in the imposition of penalties, or in the suspension or revocation of long-distance approval. See 47 U. S. C. § 271(d)(6)(A). Verizon also subjected itself to oversight by the PSC under a so-called "Performance Assurance Plan" (PAP). See In re New York Telephone Co., 197 P. U. R. 4th 266, 280-281 (N. Y. PSC, 1999) (Order Adopting the Amended PAP). The PAP, which by its terms became binding upon FCC approval, provides specific financial penalties in the event of Verizon's failure to achieve detailed performance requirements. The FCC described Verizon's having entered into a PAP as a significant factor in its § 271 authorization, because that provided "a strong financial incentive for post-entry compliance with the section 271 checklist," and prevented " 'backsliding.' " In re Application 3958-3959, ¶¶ 8, 12.
The regulatory response to the OSS failure complained of in respondent's suit provides a vivid example of how the regulatory regime operates. When several competitive LECs complained about deficiencies in Verizon's servicing of orders, the FCC and PSC responded. The FCC soon concluded that Verizon was in breach of its sharing duties under § 251(c), imposed a substantial fine, and set up sophisticated measurements to gauge remediation, with weekly reporting requirements and specific penalties for failure. The PSC found Verizon in violation of the PAP even earlier, and imposed additional financial penalties and measurements with daily reporting requirements. In short, the regime was an effective steward of the antitrust function.
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