Cite as: 540 U. S. 44 (2003)
Syllabus
than others because of a protected characteristic. Liability depends on whether the protected trait actually motivated the employer's action. The latter involve facially neutral employment practices that fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Such practices may be deemed illegally discriminatory without evidence of the employer's subjective discrimination. Both claims are cognizable under the ADA, but courts must be careful to distinguish between the theories. Here, respondent was limited to the disparate-treatment theory that petitioner refused to rehire him because it regarded him as disabled and/or because of his record of disability. Petitioner's proffer of its neutral no-rehire policy plainly satisfied its obligation under McDonnell Douglas to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire respondent. Thus, the only remaining question before the Ninth Circuit was whether there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that petitioner did make its employment decision based on respondent's status as disabled despite its proffered explanation. Instead, that court concluded that, as a matter of law, the policy was not a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason sufficient to defeat a prima facie case of discrimination. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit improperly focused on factors that pertain only to disparate-impact claims, and thus ignored the fact that petitioner's norehire policy is a quintessential legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for refusing to rehire an employee who was terminated for violating work-place conduct rules. Pp. 52-55.
298 F. 3d 1030, vacated and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all other Members joined, except Souter, J., who took no part in the decision of the case, and Breyer, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Carter G. Phillips argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the briefs were Alan Charles Raul, Paul Grossman, Paul W. Cane, Jr., Neal D. Mollen, Jay B. Stephens, and Ronald Stolkin.
Deputy Solicitor General Clement argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Olson, Assistant Attorney General Boyd, John P. Elwood, David K. Flynn, and Sarah E. Harrington.
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