Cite as: 540 U. S. 668 (2004)
Syllabus
Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. S. 509. Banks satisfied this requirement by alleging in his 1992 state-court habeas application that the prosecution knowingly failed to turn over exculpatory evidence about Farr. Banks, however, failed to produce evidence in state postconviction court establishing that Farr had served as Deputy Sheriff Huff's informant. In the federal habeas forum, Banks must show that he was not thereby barred from producing evidence to substantiate his Farr Brady claim. Banks would be entitled to a federal-court evidentiary hearing if he could show both cause for his failure to develop facts in state court, and actual prejudice resulting from that failure. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U. S. 1, 11. A Brady prosecutorial misconduct claim has three essential elements. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U. S. 263, 281-282. Beyond debate, the first such element—that the evidence at issue be favorable to the accused as exculpatory or impeaching—is satisfied here. Farr's paid informant status plainly qualifies as evidence advantageous to Banks. Cause and prejudice in this case parallel the second and third of the three Brady components. Corresponding to the second Brady element—that the State suppressed the evidence at issue—a petitioner shows cause when the reason for the failure to develop facts in state-court proceedings was the State's suppression of the relevant evidence. Coincident with the third Brady component—that prejudice ensued— prejudice within the compass of the "cause and prejudice" requirement exists when suppressed evidence is "material" for Brady purposes. Ibid. Thus, if Banks succeeds in demonstrating cause and prejudice, he will also succeed in establishing the essential elements of his Farr Brady claim. Pp. 690-691. (2) Banks has shown cause for failing to present evidence in state court capable of substantiating his Farr Brady claim. As Strickler instructs, 527 U. S., at 289, three inquiries underlie the "cause" determination: (1) whether the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence; (2) whether the petitioner reasonably relied on the prosecution's open file policy as fulfilling the prosecution's duty to disclose such evidence; and (3) whether the State confirmed the petitioner's reliance on that policy by asserting during the state habeas proceedings that the petitioner had already received everything known to the government. This case is congruent with Strickler in all three respects. First, the State knew of, but kept back, Farr's arrangement with Deputy Huff. Cf. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 437. Second, the State asserted, on the eve of trial, that it would disclose all Brady material. Banks cannot be faulted for relying on that representation. See Strickler, 527 U. S., at 283-284. Third, in its answer to Banks's 1992 state habeas application, the State denied Banks's assertions that Farr was a police informant and Banks's arrest a "set-up." The State thereby confirmed
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