672
Syllabus
Banks's reliance on the prosecution's representation that it had disclosed all Brady material. In this regard, Banks's case is stronger than was the Strickler petitioner's: Each time Farr misrepresented his dealings with police, the prosecution allowed that testimony to stand uncorrected. Cf. Giglio v. United States, 405 U. S. 150, 153. Banks appropriately assumed police would not engage in improper litigation conduct to obtain a conviction. None of the State's arguments for distinguishing Strickler on the "cause" issue accounts adequately for the State's concealment and misrepresentation of Farr's link to Huff. In light of those misrepresentations, Banks did not lack appropriate diligence in pursuing the Farr Brady claim in state court. Nor is Banks at fault for failing to move, in the 1992 state-court postconviction proceedings, for investigative assistance so that he could inquire into Farr's police connections, for state law entitled him to no such aid. Further, Roviaro v. United States, 353 U. S. 53, which concerned the Government's obligation to reveal the identity of an informant it does not call as a witness, does not support the State's position. Pp. 692-698. (3) The State's suppression of Farr's informant status is "material" for Brady purposes. The materiality standard for Brady claims is met when "the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U. S., at 435. Farr was paid for a critical role in the scenario that led to Banks's indictment. Farr's declaration, presented to the federal habeas court, asserts that Farr, not Banks, initiated the proposal to obtain a gun to facilitate robberies. Had Farr not instigated, upon Deputy Huff's request, the Dallas excursion to fetch Banks's gun, the prosecution would have had slim, if any, evidence that Banks planned to continue committing violent acts. Farr's admission of his instigating role, moreover, would have dampened the prosecution's zeal in urging the jury to consider Banks's acquisition of a gun to commit robbery or his "planned violence." Because Banks had no criminal record, Farr's testimony about Banks's propensity to violence was crucial to the prosecution. Without that testimony, the State could not have underscored to the jury that Banks would use the gun fetched in Dallas to "take care" of trouble arising during robberies. The stress placed by the prosecution on this part of Farr's testimony, uncorroborated by any other witness, belies the State's suggestion that Farr's testimony was adequately corroborated. The prosecution's penalty-phase summation, moreover, left no doubt about the importance the State attached to Farr's testimony. In contrast to Strickler, where the Court found "cause," 527 U. S., at 289, but no "prejudice," id., at 292-296, the existence of "prejudice" in this case is marked. Farr's trial testimony was the centerpiece of the Banks prosecution's penalty-phase case. That
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