Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (USA) Ltd., 540 U.S. 736, 9 (2004)

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744

POSTAL SERVICE v. FLAMINGO INDUSTRIES (USA) LTD.

Opinion of the Court

Act applies to the Postal Service. This conflated the two steps and resulted in an erroneous conclusion. See Meyer, supra, at 484.

As to the first step, as an "independent establishment of the executive branch of the Government of the United States," 39 U. S. C. § 201, the Postal Service is part of the Government and that status indicates immunity unless there is a waiver. The sue-and-be-sued clause waives immunity, and makes the Postal Service amenable to suit, as well as to the incidents of judicial process. § 401. See Meyer, supra, at 482; Loeffler, supra, at 565; Franchise Tax Bd., supra, at 525. While Congress waived the immunity of the Postal Service, Congress did not strip it of its governmental status. The distinction is important. An absence of immunity does not result in liability if the substantive law in question is not intended to reach the federal entity. So we proceed to Meyer's second step to determine if the substantive antitrust liability defined by the statute extends to the Postal Service. Under Meyer's second step, we must look to the statute.

Some years before Meyer was decided, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized the two distinct inquiries required when the question is whether the Government, or an entity it owns, is named as a defendant in a suit under the antitrust laws. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Alaska R. Co., 659 F. 2d 243, 245 (1981) (R. Ginsburg, J.). That is the correct approach. Upon examining the Sherman Act, our decisions interpreting it, and the statutes that create and organize the Postal Service, we conclude that the Postal Service is not subject to antitrust liability.

The Sherman Act imposes liability on any "person." It defines the word. It provides that " 'person' . . . shall be deemed to include corporations and associations existing under or authorized by the laws of either the United States [or of States or foreign governments]." 15 U. S. C. § 7. It follows then, that corporate or governmental status in most instances is not a bar to the imposition of liability on an en-

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