Appeal No. 97-1931
Application 08/364,826
respect to claim 1, appellants argue that a single computer is
disclosed as capable of performing the functions of the first
means whereas Dworkin requires at least two computers to receive
and convey information with respect to each wholesaler.
According to appellants, this difference represents a structural
non-equivalence when claim 1 is interpreted under the sixth
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 [brief, pages 10-11]. We do not
agree.
As the examiner has pointed out, claim 2 recites that the
first means comprises a plurality of computers. This claim
recitation demonstrates that the first means of claim 1 is
disclosed as being either a single computer or a plurality of
computers. Thus, claim 1 recites the first means in a form which
is generic to the presence of one computer or a plurality of
computers. When interpreting a generic claim for prior art
purposes, any species of the genus is considered to meet the
claimed genus. Therefore, when interpreting claim 1 under the
sixth paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, the claim should be read as
incorporating whichever species is suggested by the prior art. A
single computer will not be read into the claim for the first
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