Appeal No. 96-2160
Application 07/862,888
OPINION
We have carefully considered the subject matter on appeal, the rejection advanced
by the examiner and the evidence of anticipation relied upon by the examiner as support
for the rejection. We have, likewise, reviewed and taken into consideration, in reaching
our decision, the appellants’ arguments set forth in the briefs along with the examiner’s
rationale in support of the rejection and arguments in rebuttal set forth in the examiner’s
answer.
It is our view, after consideration of the record before us, that the disclosure of
Deitel does fully meet the invention as set forth in claims 1-8. Accordingly, we affirm.
Anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102 requires that each element of the claim in issue
be found, either expressly described or under principles of inherency, in a single prior art
reference. Kalman v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 771, 218 USPQ 781, 789
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984). The examiner has indicated how he
reads each of the claims on the disclosure of Deitel [answer,
pages 2-5]. Appellants argued the claims as a single group in the original brief, and their
only argument was that there was no “provision of a first expedited task scheduling path
and a second task scheduling path within Dietel [sic] in the manner which is expressly set
forth within these claims” [brief, page 7]. The examiner responded that the preemptive
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