Ex parte GRINKUS - Page 23




          Appeal No. 96-2905                                                          
          Application No. 29/008,076                                                  


          parte Owen referred to in the earlier dissenting opinion,                   
          without providing any constitutionally required procedural                  
          safeguards.                                                                 


               I also observe that the determination of indefiniteness                
          is a question of law which can be raised sua sponte by courts.              
          However, as indicated at pages 16 and 17 of the earlier                     
          decision, all of the appellate and district courts confronted               
          with the expression "substantially" in the context of design                
          patent claims have not held that expression to be indefinite.               
          In my view, implicit in their decisions is that the expression              
          "substantially" recited in design claims does not violate the               
          second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.                                        


               Further, I take exception to the majority's reliance on                
          Alappat to justify the procedural due process associated with               
          the expansion of the original panel.  I do not believe that                 
          Alappat is relevant to the due process issue raised by                      
          appellant for the reasons well articulated by Administrative                
          Patent Judge John D. Smith in his concurring opinion.                       


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