Appeal No. 96-4012
Application No. 08/197,908
claim 9. Accordingly, the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
rejection of claims 10-13 and 22-26 is sustained as well.
We now consider the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejection of claims
1-26 as being unpatentable over the combination of Hluchyj and
Galand. At the outset, we note that, from our earlier
discussion, it is our opinion that a prima facie case of
anticipation with respect to claims 9-13 and 22-26 has been
established since the Examiner has demonstrated that all of
the element of representative claim 9 are present in Galand.
A disclosure that anticipates under 35 U.S.C. § 102 also
renders the claim unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103, for
"anticipation is the epitome of obviousness." Jones v. Hardy,
727 F.2d 1524, 1529, 220 USPQ 1021, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
See also In re Fracalossi, 681 F.2d 792, 794, 215 USPQ 569,
571 (CCPA 1982);
In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1402, 181 USPQ 641, 644 (CCPA
1974). Thus, we sustain the examiner's rejection of appealed
claims 9-13 and 22-26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
With respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 1-8
and 14-21 based on the combination of Hluchyj and Galand, we
note that in rejecting claims under 35 U.S.C. § 103, it is
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