Interference No. 101,981
definition. In fact, the parties’ briefs make interpreting this
phrase a threshold issue (BaB 26-29 [BaI1]; BeB 25-29; QB 60-62).
As is usual in interpreting a count, we must give this
phrase the broadest reasonable interpretation.
In interpreting count 5 we have followed the well known rule
that counts in interference must be given the broadest
construction which they will reasonably permit. Kuchar v.
Armington et al., 1943 C. D. 283, 30 C.C.P.A. 872, 133 F.2d
944, 56 USPQ 553 [1943].
Collins v. Trumpler, 105 USPQ 341, 345 (Bd. Pat. Int. 1954).
The parties have differing positions on the scope of the
phrase and, while this may suggest that the phrase is ambiguous,
we find that no ambiguity actually exists. We have considered
the arguments in the briefs and, although unnecessary 15, resorted to
the specifications in clarifying the scope of the phrase. In doing so, we have determined that
Batlogg’s interpretation accords with the broadest reasonable interpretation of the count.
15 “Interference counts are given the broadest reasonable interpretation possible, and resort to the
specification is necessary only when there are ambiguities inherent in the claim language or obvious
from arguments of counsel.” DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1321-22, 226 USPQ 758, 760-61
(Fed. Cir. 1985).
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