Interference No. 103,605
publications are effective as references and defeat the
patentability of these claims.” Accordingly, the basic
underlying issue to be decided is whether the aforementioned
Japanese applications provide sufficient written description
support for the subject matter defined by Yamada claims 1 and 4
within the ambit of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and, more particularly,
whether those applications provide sufficient support for the
limitation in part(b) of claim 1 which has been underlined,
supra, for emphasis. See Ex parte Kitamura, 9 USPQ2d 1787, 1792
(Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1988); Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880,
884-86, 178 USPQ 158, 162-63 (CCPA 1973).
Aggarwal, as the moving party, bears the burden of
persuasion. See Behr v. Talbott, 27 USPQ 2d 1401, 1405 (Bd. Pat.
App. & Int. 1992); and 37 CFR § 1.637(a). After a thorough
review of the entire record in light of the opposing positions
taken by the parties in their briefs, we agree with Aggarwal that
Yamada’s Japanese priority applications (J1-J3) do not provide
sufficient descriptive support, within the context of the first
paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, for the subject matter defined by
the Yamada claims in dispute. Although there is great force of
logic in Yamada’s position, we conclude that Aggarwal’s position
better conforms with the facts and pertinent case law on the
7
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